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Abstract   34 
 35 
The ability to infer the psychological forces that drive others’ behavior is a 36 
cornerstone of human cognition.  This ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) we have has been extensively 37 
studied in its developmental stages and non-human forms. However, how the fully developed 38 
theory of mind functions on a daily basis is still the focus of ongoing research. One capacity 39 
stemming from theory of mind involves overt linguistic mental state reference.  We propose 40 
that, rather than being a capacity that those with a fully developed ToM use consistently, 41 
mental state reference is a function of our social relationship to others: specifically, whether 42 
the other is perceived as an in-group or out-group member.  We therefore examined 43 
spontaneous mental state reference during casual conversation as a function of group 44 
membership.  Participants were divided into ‘in-group’ or ‘out-group’ pairs using a classic 45 
minimal group paradigm.  Next, they were allowed to converse casually with their partner 46 
without the experimenter present and then subsequently asked to describe their partner in a 47 
written format after interactions.   We scored participants’ conversations and their written 48 
descriptions of each other for frequency and complexity of mental state reference.  Results 49 
showed that, when interacting with presumed out-group members, participants referenced 50 
their partners’ mental states significantly less often than when interacting with presumed in-51 
group members.  This effect was found both during conversations and in subsequent 52 
descriptions of the partner.  Spontaneous mental state reference is apparently not a consistent 53 










Theory of mind, or the ability to infer unobservable mental states and to use these 62 
mental states to predict future behaviour, has long been investigated in its incomplete or 63 
premature forms.  Both from a developmental perspective (Alison & Astington, 1988; e.g. 64 
Ensink & Mayes, 2010; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001) and from an inter-species 65 
comparative perspective (e.g. Call & Tomasello, 2008; Heyes, 1998; Premack & Woodruff, 66 
1978) the ‘non-normal’ theory of mind has been thoroughly canvassed, somewhat to the 67 
detriment of the study of the actual mechanism itself (Apperly et al., 2010; Apperly, Riggs, 68 
Simpson, Chiavarino, & Samson, 2006).  The normally functioning adult theory of mind has 69 
received attention more recently in roughly the last decade.  To date, evidence suggests that 70 
the use of a normally developed theory of mind (and a host of related processes) is heavily 71 
influenced by cognitive, cultural, and social factors. 72 
First, in terms of the impact other cognitive processes have on theory of mind, people 73 
have difficulty interpreting another person’s perspective without using their own knowledge 74 
as a template (e.g. Fussell & Krauss, 1991; Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000; Keysar, 75 
Lin, & Barr, 2003; Nickerson, Baddeley, & Freeman, 1987; Royzman, Cassidy, & Baron, 76 
2003).  This process, sometimes termed epistemic egocentrism, can lead to misjudgments 77 
about other’s knowledge and occurs even when people are motivated to make accurate 78 
inferences (Keysar, Ginzel, & Bazerman, 1995).  People also encounter difficulties in 79 
interpreting others’ visual perspective in the face of high executive demands and distractions 80 
(Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004; Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010), as well as with lower 81 
moods (Converse, Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2008).  Furthermore, Apperly and colleagues have 82 
shown that questions requiring theory of mind usage are answered less quickly than non-83 
mentalistic, reality-matching questions  (Apperly et al., 2006) an indication that theory of 84 
mind processes may be a function of cognitive processing demands. 85 
Second, cultural differences also seem to play a role in how effectively people take 86 
another’s perspective, as shown by a study in which Chinese and American participants were 87 
asked to infer a partner’s visual perspective (Wu & Keysar, 2007).  The Chinese participants 88 
inferred their partner’s visual perspective more accurately than their American counterparts.  89 
Third, social factors, specifically group membership, may also alter perception, 90 
making individuals less attendant to minds perceived as ‘other’ (Haslam, 2006) and more 91 
likely to stereotype those perceived as less similar (Ames, 2004).  On the more extreme end, 92 
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people categorized as ‘other’, or out-group, may be infrahumanized and attributed fewer 93 
uniquely human emotions (Leyens et al., 2001).  Dehumanization research shows similar 94 
effects, in that out-group members are attributed fewer human values and traits and more 95 
animalistic qualities than are in-group members (for a review see Haslam, 2006).  96 
Furthermore, Hackel and colleagues showed that out-group members are required to be more 97 
human to be perceived as having a mind, in that shared group membership impacted how 98 
participants perceived the presence of mind in not only actual humans but dolls as well 99 
(Hackel, Looser, & Van Bavel, 2014).  Group membership also affects how people empathise 100 
with others: considerable research has shown that empathic responses are lowered when 101 
observing out-group compared to in-group members (for a review see Cikara, Bruneau, & 102 
Saxe, 2011). 103 
The previously discussed evidence suggests that normal processing of others’ mental 104 
states is neither automatic nor consistent, and that social factors play a role in how people 105 
attribute emotions, perceive the presence of minds, and empathically respond.  If group 106 
membership can affect these processes related to theory of mind, we wanted to address 107 
whether it would also impact the mechanism in its most basic and original form, the 108 
attribution of mental states to others (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). 109 
The present study attempts to address these gaps by investigating whether group 110 
membership affects one aspect of theory of mind usage - mental state reference - in 111 
cognitively normal adults during typical, daily interactions.  Specifically, we were interested 112 
in whether group membership plays a role in how people spontaneously reference others’ 113 
mental states.  The aim of this study was to gather data from the most natural contexts 114 
possible:  unlike previous studies, we did not want to prompt theory of mind usage but rather 115 
to gauge one of its natural manifestations.   We therefore examined natural social interactions 116 
for evidence of one manifestation of theory of mind usage, spontaneous mental state 117 
reference during casual conversation.    We began by categorizing pairs of people using a 118 
classic minimal group paradigm based on estimation abilities into in-group and out-group 119 
pairs  (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971).   After categorization participants were 120 
allowed to freely converse with each other, after which we asked participants to describe their 121 
partner in a written format.  122 
Our aim was to compare participants’ conversations and their descriptions of each 123 
other to assess the impact of group membership on spontaneous mental state reference.  124 
Linguistic reference to mental states has long been considered an indication of developmental 125 
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processes children go through as they learn to form and use mental representations of others’ 126 
mental states (Piaget & Inhelder, 1966).  Even the usage of simple mental state verbs, such as 127 
‘to remember’ or ‘to hope’,  requires that the user form a mental representation of the target’s 128 
mental state, specifically, what is being remembered or hoped (Antonietti, Liverta-Sempio, 129 
Marchetti, & Astington, 2006). As such, this type of reference has been used to study 130 
children’s developing theory of mind (e.g. Meins, Fernyhough, Johnson, & Lidstone, 2006; 131 
Meins et al., 2002).   This link between language and theory of mind has been exploited by 132 
researchers to develop the ‘Spontaneous Theory of Mind Protocol’ (STOMP), which 133 
measures spontaneous descriptions of the mental states of characters in videos to show that it 134 
correlates with thickness of certain cortical areas of the brain (Rice & Redcay, 2014).  The 135 
STOMP approach used trained coders to differentiate between physical and mental state 136 
reference, whereas our design used a finite list of mental state reference words, based on and 137 
including words used to study mental-reference in children (Jenkins, Turrell, Kogushi, Lollis, 138 
& Ross, 2003) as well as the ‘state verbs’ used in the linguistic category model (LCM) 139 
approach (Semin & Fiedler, 1988).  We used this list to examine participants’ conversations 140 
and their subsequent written descriptions of each other to compare how participants 141 




Participants  146 
 147 
Participants were recruited using noticeboards around the University of St Andrews after the 148 
study was approved by the university’s Ethics Committee.  Participants from all departments 149 
except psychology were accepted to take part in the study.  86 female undergraduates (age 150 
range 17 – 20) took part in the study to form a total of 43 pairs.   In this way we controlled for 151 
the gender of our participants in order to avoid gender effects, or the possibility that 152 
participants would use gender to categorise themselves on top of our group manipulation (Ito 153 
& Urland, 2003).   154 
Two pairs of participants were discarded from analysis:  one because one of the 155 
participants had previous experience with minimal group paradigms, and another because the 156 
recording equipment did not function during the trial.  In total this produced 41 pairs:  21 in 157 
the out-group condition and 20 in the in-group condition.  All participants were tested in a 158 
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single session lasting approximately 30 minutes.  All participants were naïve to the 159 
experimental hypothesis, told that their data would be treated confidentially and used 160 
anonymously in publication, gave informed consent, were fully debriefed at the end of each 161 
experiment, and received £3 for participation.  162 
 163 
Procedure 164 
  165 
The experiment was conducted in the Social Immersion Lab in the Psychology 166 
Department at the University of St Andrews.  Prior to the experiment it was confirmed that 167 
participants did not know each other in any way.  Participants arrived at the lab at the same 168 
time and were given instructions before any social chatting could take place.  Participants 169 
were given information forms describing the experiment and then asked to complete a 170 
consent form. 171 
As the minimal group paradigm, participants were told the cover story that the 172 
experiment was designed to study the link between cognitive style and social interaction.  To 173 
that end, the experimenter would first assess their cognitive style and then ask them to 174 
complete a social interaction task.  Their cognitive style, they were told, would be assessed 175 
using a test called the ‘Dot Estimation Task’ (DET), which was in reality the minimal group 176 
paradigm used to categorize participants into out-group and in-group conditions (adapted 177 
from Howard & Rothbart, 1980).  Participants were told that using the DET the experimenter 178 
would be able to tell whether they were over- or under-estimators, and that this categorization 179 
was significant since estimation abilities correlated with such abilities as spatial computation 180 
and mathematical skills.  The DET itself involved estimating the amount of dots present on 181 
three consecutive pictures (made using Power Point, see Fig. 1 for example below).  Dot 182 
pictures were presented for 3 seconds each using Microsoft Power Point and a projector.    183 
 184 
   Figure 1 about here 185 
 186 
Figure  1.  Representative illustration of a ‘Dot Estimation Task’ picture   187 
 188 
Participants were asked to write down their estimates for each picture and to do the 189 
task alone in order to ‘get a clear and true read-out’ of each of their cognitive styles.  In actual 190 
fact this request was designed to keep participants from discussing their answers and thereby 191 
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realizing that there was no actual correlation between estimates and assigned category.  The 192 
experimenter then made a brief show of calculating the average of their estimations, and then 193 
arbitrarily assigned each participant to be either an over- or under-estimator.  Participants 194 
were asked to wear a badge with their estimation type displayed on it (two ‘over’ or ‘under’ 195 
estimators in the in-group condition, and one of each in the out-group condition).  196 
Participants were told this was so that ‘the experimenter would not forget who was what for 197 
future analysis’ whereas it was in fact done to maintain the salience of the categorization.    198 
Again, this categorization was in reality arbitrary.   199 
Once categorized, participants were told that they would take a short break from the 200 
experiment to allow the experimenter to set up the rest of the experiment before the social 201 
interaction.  Participants were told they were allowed to chat to pass the time before the 202 
supposed upcoming social task if they wanted.  The experimenter then left the room and 203 
allowed the participants 7 minutes to freely converse, during which time the CCTV camera 204 
system in the lab was recording.  After the conversation, participants were separated and 205 
asked to ‘solidify their impressions’ of each other by completing a free-form written 206 
description of their partner before the supposed social interaction task.  Participants were told 207 
that their written descriptions would remain anonymous and that their only purpose was to 208 
allow each participant to collect and focus their impressions of the other before the 209 
interaction task.  After completing the written descriptions the experiment was concluded and 210 
participants were told that there was in actual fact no social interaction task.  Participants 211 
were then debriefed in full and paid. 212 
 213 
Coding   214 
 215 
Previous research has shown that the use of mental state verbs provides a useful 216 
metric of theory of mind functioning (Bretherton, McNew, & Beeghly-Smith, 1981; Dunn, 217 
Bretherton, & Munn, 1987).  Mental state verb usage is correlated with children’s theory of 218 
mind development as measured by false belief tasks (Brown, Donelan-McCall, & Dunn, 219 
1996).  Mental state talk has been coded in a variety of ways, usually tailored to the study’s 220 
particular aims.  The aim of the current study was to quantify differences in linguistic 221 
manifestation of mental state reference as a function of our group manipulation. To this end, 222 
a master list of mental state words was devised to identify all references participants made to 223 




To devise the master word list, we began with previous research which analysed 226 
spoken language to identify instances of mental state reference (e.g. Bartsch & Wellman, 227 
1995; Jenkins et al., 2003; Shatz, Wellman, & Silber, 1983).  The Jenkins list (2003) has 228 
come to be the standard list used in developmental research.  However, the terms that 229 
constitute the Jenkins list are not exhaustive of all possible ways in which adults reference 230 
mental states.  We therefore added to the Jenkins list the ‘state verbs’ identified by the 231 
Linguistic Category Model (Semin & Fiedler, 1988), except for those that did not fit the 232 
following rule:  the word was required to make sense if and only if the concept of a mental 233 
state was invoked.  The ‘state verbs’ that did not pertain solely to a mental state (but in some 234 
cases could describe a behaviour or a personality) and that were therefore excluded from our 235 
mental state term list were the following:  aggressive, charismatic, impulsive, moody, 236 
outgoing, reliable, and  reserved. For example, ‘aggressive’ could be used to describe an 237 
‘aggressive behaviour’ without reference to the person as such.  Hence, these aforementioned 238 
words were excluded from our coding system to avoid ambiguity. 239 
The current corpus of transcribed speech showed that participants in the current study 240 
used many more expressions to reference mental states than those listed by both Jenkins et al 241 
(2003) and the LCM model.  The first author and a second coder therefore submitted the 242 
transcribed corpus to a two-stage analysis to form a more complete master list.  First, all 243 
terms that pertained to any mental state were identified by both the first coder (first author) 244 
and a second coder separately.  This involved each coder combing the manuscript for 245 
statements that adhered to the aforementioned rule:  the statement was required to make sense 246 
if and only if the concept of a mental state was invoked.  When this rule was met, the term 247 
used was then added to the master list.  We identified another 71 verbs used to reference 248 
mental states (e.g. to be interested in, to be pleased to, to learn., etc).   See table 1 for 249 
complete master list.  The two coders identified the same terms in the corpus except for three, 250 
‘to reckon’, ‘to find’ (in the context of a sentiment or thought as opposed to an object), and 251 
‘to be only joking’.  After discussion the two coders agreed that these three terms each fit the 252 
rule of necessitating the concept of a mental state to be understood and so were subsequently 253 
added to the master list. 254 
Some terms are more ambiguous, in that they can be used to actively refer to a mental 255 
state or simply as conversation fillers that hold some social function.  For instance, although 256 
conversation analysts previously treated the phrase ‘you know’ that exists without an object 257 
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as an ambiguous filler (G. Brown, 1977), more recent work with adult discourse analysis 258 
treats ‘you know’ as a referent to either shared knowledge (Edwards, 1997; Holmes, 1986; 259 
Potter, Hepburn , & Tileagă, 2011) or knowledge the recipient alone holds (P. Brown & 260 
Levinson, 1987).  Therefore, in order to parallel recent content analysis techniques we have 261 







to be pleased to 
to be tempted to 
to be interested in 
to be bothered to 
to be keen on 
to look forward to 
to be bored of 
to have a crush on  











to hold in contempt 
to prefer 
 
to feel _____ 
to be hurt 
to be angry 
to be happy 




to be afraid 
to enjoy 
to have fun 
to be glad 
to be mad 
to be scared 
to be upset 
to be surprised 
to fear 
to be disgusted 
to worry 
to be anxious 
to be relieved 
to be shocked 
to be disappointed 
to be nervous 












to have a clue 
to be confused 
to notice 
to assume 
to find out 
to underestimate 
to agree 
to be sure 
to make sense 
to disagree 
to be able to relate  
to judge 
to be determined  








to have an idea 




to figure (out) 
to plan to 
to lie 









to find (in the sense of a 
cognitive act, i.e. without 
a physical object) 
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Table 1. Master list of words used to reference mental states. 265 
 266 
Once the master list was formed, coding was carried out on the entire corpus. The first 267 
coder coded the entire corpus of transcribed conversations and written descriptions while the 268 
second coder coded 20% of each.  Both coders were blind to experimental condition and the 269 
second coder was blind to the hypothesis.  First, each instance of mental state reference using 270 
any of the terms on the master list was identified in the corpus. This consisted of using a 271 
Microsoft Word XP ‘find’ function to locate every occurrence of each word on the master list 272 
(and all related grammatical forms).  All grammatical forms were located by inputting the 273 
stem of a verb into the search function, or each grammatical form individually for irregular 274 
verbs.  For example, to find all references to the mental state ‘to want’, the word ‘want’ was 275 
inserted into the search function and every instance of all grammatical forms, including to 276 
want, wanted, wanting, and will want, were all highlighted.  The same procedure was applied 277 
to participants’ written impressions of each other.  To be considered an instance of mental 278 
state reference, the same rule was invoked requiring that the statement could be made sense if 279 
and only if the concept of a mental state was invoked.  For example, in one written 280 
impression a participant wrote the following: ‘She was nervous.  Lots of nervous laughter’.  281 
The phrase ‘She was nervous’ was coded as a mental state reference (as it referred to the 282 
partner’s mental state), while ‘Lots of nervous laughter’ was not coded as mental state 283 
reference since here the word ‘nervous’ did not refer to the partner’s mental state but to the 284 
laughter itself.     285 
Next, once all usages of the mental state reference terms were located, each was 286 
coded for complexity of mental state reference (as either ‘basic’, ‘complex’, or ‘highly 287 
complex’) along with whether the object of the mental state attribution in the utterance was 288 
the speaker or the partner (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1989; Flavel, Botkin, Fry, Wright, & Jarvis, 289 
1968; Wimmer & Perner, 1983).  ‘Basic’ mental state reference is equivalent to what is 290 
sometimes called ‘first order’ mental state reference in that it involves only one degree of 291 
11 
 
intentionality and references one mental state alone (Dennett, 1987).  For example ‘You like 292 
chocolate?’ contains reference to only one mental state and would qualify as a basic 293 
reference.  Basic mental state references included such statements as ‘What do you think of 294 
it?’ (partner as object, trial 22) and ‘and  I’m not like a hideously messy person, I like to have 295 
a bit of mess’ (self as object, trial 35).   ‘Complex’ mental state reference is equivalent to 296 
what is also called ‘second order’ mental state reference: it involves a statement with two 297 
degrees of intentionality realised by using two mental states in reference to each other within 298 
the same expression (Dennett, 1987).  This included such utterances as, ‘ok, you have to think 299 
back to your first thoughts of me’ (partner as object, trial 37) and ‘I think I wasn’t quite so 300 
sure before I came’ (self as object, trial 1). ‘Highly-complex’ mental state reference 301 
(equivalent to Dennett’s ‘third order intentionality’) combines three mental state terms in one 302 
utterance.  Highly-complex mental state reference only occurred when participants were 303 
speaking about themselves, such as in the statement, ‘I wish I knew what I wanted to do’ (self 304 
as object, trial 5).  Lastly, all references to both the self and the partner that did not involve 305 
the use of one of the mental state terms in table 1 were located and coded.  These ‘non-306 
mentalistic’ references were required to make sense if and only if either the speaker or the 307 
speaker’s partner was invoked as the referent of the statement without the use of a mental 308 
state term from the master list. 309 
Correlation between the two coders was assessed by calculating cohen’s kappa for 310 
each of the categories of mental state and non-mentalistic reference in the conversations and 311 
in the written descriptions.  Inter-rater reliability was high with all kappas, > 0 .86.  Given the 312 
small sample size, all of the complex and highly-complex instances of mental state reference 313 
were then coded by the second coder (still blind to condition and hypothesis) which produced 314 




Data Analysis 319 
 320 
To assess the impact of group membership on spoken conversation and written 321 
descriptions we  conducted generalized linear mixed models with the individual as the unit of 322 
analysis, the fixed effect set as group membership, and the random effect set as the pair that 323 
participants conversed in. All analysis was conducted using SPSS 24.  Analyses were divided 324 
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into the following sections  3.1) Natural conversations: 3.2) Writen impressions, and 3.3) 325 
Correlation between mental state reference in conversations and written descriptions.  326 
 327 
Natural Conversation Results 328 
 329 
Analysis of participants’ spontaneous conversations is divided into the following 330 
sections: A) ‘Overall conversation’, that is, amount of total speech as a function of group 331 
membership, B) ‘Non-theory of mind reference’, including all reference that does not involve 332 
attributing mental states to the partner, and C) ‘Theory of mind like reference’, including all 333 
references to the partner’s mental states. 334 
 335 
A) Overall conversation.   336 
 337 
First, in comparing the overall amount of spoken conversation between conditions, we 338 
see that group membership had no effect on total words spoken: out-group condition 339 
(estimated marginal mean = 676.159) vs in-group condition (estimated marginal mean = 340 
660.106; F(1, 80) = .46, p = .5).  This is important because it indicates that any differences in 341 
mental state referencing cannot be ascribed to absolute differences in the overall amount of 342 
speech produced or the motivation to converse.  However, we nevertheless analyse all 343 
subsequent differences in conversation as a function of percentage of total utterances for the 344 
sake of accurate comparability across conditions.  345 
Also, to ensure that there was no effect of the specific categories used in our minimal 346 
group paradigm (over- and under-estimators) we also conducted GLZMs on in-group pairs 347 
alone to determine whether category type affected any of the referencing behaviours, 348 
including mental state reference and non-mental state reference.  We found no effect of 349 
category type in any of the following analysis, in that over-estimators did not significantly 350 
differ from under-estimators along any dimension.  We therefore pooled both types of 351 
estimators for the in-group condition in all analyses. 352 
 353 
B) Non-‘theory of mind’ reference. 354 
 355 
Regarding statements which require no theory of mind processing, we looked at the 356 
effect of group membership on non-mentalistic reference to the self and the partner, as well 357 
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as mentalistic reference to the self (using mental state verbs as defined above in the coding 358 
section).  For example, non-mentalistic references to the self included things like, ‘I tend to 359 
leave things ‘til the last minute so…’ (trial 40), or, ‘I never saw a person faint in front of me’ 360 
(trial 34).  Non-mentalistic references to the partner included both statements and questions 361 
that referenced the partner without using the mental state verbs listed in table 1.  For example, 362 
a non-mentalistic reference to the partner was, ‘Do you have brothers and sisters that you left 363 
behind?’ (trial 10), or ‘You’re not from the UK, though’ (trial 36).  Mentalistic reference to 364 
the self included  statements like ‘I miss not having animals around’ (trial 10, basic 365 
reference), and ‘I knew that like at 18 or whatever I couldn’t fathom being in a different 366 
country from my parents’ (trial 29, complex reference).  Table 2 summarises non-theory-of-367 
mind reference as a function of group membership. 368 
 369 
 370 
      Estimated 
Marginal Means (% 
of total utterances) 
 
F (1,80) = 
 
P value 

















































Of the references participants made that required no theory of mind abilities, only the 375 
non-mentalistic references to the self and the partner differed significantly between in-group 376 
and out-group conditions.  That is, shared group membership increased both non-mentalistic 377 
reference to the self and the partner.  No significant differences were found regarding 378 
mentalistic reference to the self.   379 
 380 
C) ‘Theory of mind-like’ reference to the partner. 381 
 382 
We next analyzed the impact of group membership on how participants referenced 383 
their partners’ basic mental states, indicated by the presence of any one of the words on the 384 
master list used in reference to the partner’s mental state.  First, participants talked about their 385 
partners’ basic mental states less if their partner was an out-group member (estimated 386 
marginal mean = 1.2%) than a presumed in-group member (estimated marginal mean = 3.8%; 387 
F (1, 80) = 205.634, p = .000, fig. 2).  That is, statements that referred to a partner’s basic 388 
mental states, such as ‘So, would you like to be a lecturer?’ (Trial 12) were more common 389 
when participants spoke with in-group than out-group members. 390 
 391 
                                   Figure 2 about here 392 
 393 
Figure 2.  Percentage of references to a partner’s basic mental states in natural conversations 394 
(estimated marginal means ± SE) as a function of group membership. 395 
 396 
Given the infrequency of complex reference to the partner’s mental states (eight times 397 
in our entire data set with no pair using this type of reference more than once) we used a 398 
simple Fisher’s exact test to assess whether this type of reference was more likely to occur in 399 
the in-group or out-group conditions.  In fact, participants referenced their partners’ complex 400 
mental states less frequently when speaking with an out-group member (1 times total) than 401 
with an in-group member (7 times total; p < .02, Fisher’s exact test).   That is, statements 402 
such as, ‘What you might find is that you enjoy it more’ (trial 39) were more likely to be used 403 
between in-group members than between out-group members. 404 
 405 




Figure 3.  Total references to a partner’s complex mental states in natural conversations as a 408 
function of group membership. 409 
 410 
Written Impressions Results 411 
 412 
A) Overall amount of written words. 413 
 414 
Questionnaire data from 6 pairs was unavailable as these pairs requested to leave 415 
early due to time constraints. There was no statistical difference between the total number of 416 
words participants wrote when describing an out-group partner (estimated marginal mean = 417 
88.294) compared to describing an in-group partner (estimated marginal mean = 74.583; F(1, 418 
68) = 2.578, p > .113).  Again this is important as it shows that our minimal group 419 
manipulation did not affect participants’ motivation to write about their partners. 420 
 421 
B) Basic mental state reference to the partner. 422 
 423 
Sentences written by participants were coded as either no mental state reference, basic 424 
mental state reference (one mental state verb in the sentence), or complex mental state 425 
reference (two mental state verbs in the sentence) according to the same coding scheme 426 
described above for conversation.  Amount of both basic and complex mental state reference 427 
was calculated as a percentage of total sentences written. Out-group members were described 428 
less frequently in terms of their basic mental states (estimated marginal mean = 9.70%) than 429 
were in-group members (estimated marginal mean = 27.60%), F(1, 68) = 14.948, p = .000, 430 
fig. 4). For example, statements such as ‘She doesn’t want to fly into a conversation quickly’ 431 
(Trial 4) were more likely to be written about in-group than out-group members. 432 
 433 
                                   Figure 4 about here 434 
 435 
Figure 4.  Percentage of reference to the partner’s basic mental states in written impressions 436 
(estimated marginal means ± SE) as a function of group membership. 437 
 438 
C) Complex partner mental state reference. 439 
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Although participants used more complex forms of mental state reference more rarely, 440 
the same pattern was found.  That is, participants writing about presumed out-group members 441 
referenced their complex mental states less frequently (estimated marginal mean = .5%) than 442 
those writing about presumed in-group members (estimated marginal mean = 3.6%; F (1, 68) 443 
= 8.457, p = .005; fig. 5). For example, participants were significantly more likely to write 444 
complex statements referring to a partner’s mental states, such as ‘She’s not afraid to do what 445 
she wants’ (Trial 28), about in-group than out-group members. 446 
 447 
                       Figure 5 about here 448 
 449 
Figure 5.  Percentage of reference to the partner’s complex mental states in the written 450 
impressions (estimated marginal means ± SE) as a function of group membership. 451 
 452 
Correlation Between Mental State Reference in Conversation and Written Descriptions 453 
 454 
It is possible that the level of mental state reference participants manifest during 455 
conversation influenced their subsequent descriptions of their partner.  That is, if people are 456 
provided with more mental state information about a person they may then be more prone to 457 
use that information preferentially over other information when describing a person, or they 458 
may simply have had less non-mentalistic information to hand with which to describe a 459 
person.  Whichever is the case, it seems logical to assume that the conversations participants 460 
engaged in might have influenced the way in which they considered and described their 461 
partner afterward.  However, we found no correlation between amount of total mental state 462 
reference in conversation and amount of total mental state reference in participants’ 463 





In this study we aimed to determine whether people reference other’s mental states 469 
automatically and consistently, or whether different social contexts, for example group 470 
membership, produce different referential behavior.  To do this, we analyzed how people 471 
reference another person’s mental states in both natural conversations and in subsequent 472 
17 
 
written descriptions as a function of artificially manipulated group membership.  Broadly, our 473 
results showed that group membership affects how people overtly refer to another person’s 474 
mental states, both immediately during an interaction and after it. 475 
We first examined participants’ casual conversations in order to examine the effect of 476 
group membership on spontaneous mental state reference as well as reference that would not 477 
require theory of mind processes. For non-theory-of-mind reference, it seems that shared 478 
group membership increases references to both the self and the partner that do not involve 479 
use of mental state verbs.  So, for example, in-group participants discussed their current and 480 
past lives than out-group participants did.  This could be because such references were aimed 481 
at uncovering shared interests to solidify or expand their shared identity, or simply due to 482 
participants in the in-group condition being more at ease with each other and hence more 483 
likely to discuss more personal information. Regarding reference that required mentalising, 484 
results revealed that, when interacting with an out-group member, participants referenced 485 
their partner’s mental states less than when interacting with an in-group member.  This effect 486 
held for both conversations during immediate interactions and for descriptions participants 487 
wrote about their partners even after interacting with them.  Group membership also had the 488 
same effect on different levels of referential complexity, in that participants talking with an 489 
out-group member referenced both their basic and complex mental states less frequently than 490 
participants talking with an in-group member.  Similarly, in their written descriptions, 491 
participants wrote less about out-group member’s basic and complex mental states than they 492 
did about in-group members’ basic and complex mental states.  Importantly, as we show 493 
there is no correlation between mental state reference in conversation and mental state 494 
reference in written descriptions, this suggests that group membership is independently 495 
impacting these two processes. That is, we can rule out two alternative causes of increased 496 
mental-state terms in in-group participants’ descriptions: a) that some individuals are simply 497 
more prone to overtly reference others’ mental states regardless of the mode of reference, or 498 
b) that group membership impacts only spoken mental state reference which could have then 499 
primed in-group participants to increase their usage of mental state terms when describing 500 
their partner.   501 
These results suggest that people are less likely to overtly reference other people’s 502 
mental states if they perceive those others as out-group members.  Importantly, this effect 503 
occurred despite the fact that groups were artificially created using arbitrary characteristics.   504 
That is, the groups in our study had no real-life group histories or prejudices between them 505 
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which could have led participants to stereotype or react to partners based on implicit 506 
associations (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Stott & Reicher, 1998).  This suggests 507 
that the difference in mental state reference shown here is a result of categorization based on 508 
group membership itself and not any other social or individual factors.  However, it is worth 509 
noting a caveat of our design, that our minimal group paradigm could have impacted 510 
perceived similarity (as a function of their assigned ‘cognitive style’).  There is currently 511 
conflicting evidence regarding the impact of perceived similarity on processes related to 512 
theory of mind.  For instance, while the accepted notion was that perceived similarity 513 
increases empathy (Davis, 1994) more recent studies have shown that, in fact, basic drives to 514 
nurture and protect have a bigger impact on empathy than perceived similarity (Batson, 515 
Lishner, Cook, & Sawyer, 2005).  Future research will be able to dissociate the impact of 516 
shared group membership and perceived similarity on empathy and other processes linked to 517 
theory of mind (as well as extend the sample to males to examine any possible gender 518 
differences of this specific manifestation of theory of mind). 519 
Our results also build on and extend research based on the Linguistic Category Model 520 
(LCM)  (Semin & Fiedler, 1991).  First, we have extended the LCM ‘state verb’ list to 521 
provide a more complete list of terms which people use to reference mental states.  Secondly, 522 
we have extended the application of this type of natural conversation and description 523 
analysis.  The LCM has been used to elucidate the typical inter-group biases shown in a vast 524 
variety of behavioural studies.  For example, Maass and colleagues (Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, & 525 
Semin, 1989) showed that people used more abstract and dispositional terms to describe 526 
positive in-group behaviour and negative out-group behaviour (which was interpreted as 527 
furthering in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination).  Along the same lines,  Fiedler 528 
and colleagues (Fiedler, Semin, & Finkenauer, 1993) showed that people used more 529 
stereotypic language across all five of the LCM’s defined categories when describing a 530 
gender out-group than a gender in-group, again suggesting a mode by which out-group 531 
discrimination is perpetuated.  The current results are the first, however, to show that the 532 
actual quantity of mental state reference used in interaction and description differs as a 533 
function of the partner’s group membership.  As such our results expand on the LCM 534 
literature by suggesting both cognitive and behavioural mechanisms by which out-group 535 
discrimination and, conversely, in-group favouritism are facilitated.   536 
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While our results have shown an effect of group membership on mental state reference as a 537 
behavior, we cannot conclusively say which cognitive process this stems from.  That is, even 538 
though mental state reference is commonly used as a proxy to gauge both mental state 539 
attribution and  theory of mind usage (Schwanenflugel, Henderson, & Fabricius, 1998; 540 
Schwanenflugel, Martin, & Takahashi, 1999) , strictly speaking, a difference in this type of 541 
referential behavior does not necessarily stem from a difference in underlying mental state 542 
attribution.  That is, participants may or may not be attributing mental states to their partners 543 
regardless of how they overtly reference them in conversation. For example, participants may 544 
be truly unconcerned with an out-grouper’s mental states and not even ‘turn on’ their theory 545 
of mind when interacting with them.  Alternatively, theory of mind processes may be alive 546 
and active even with out-group members but people may choose not to show evidence of 547 
such during interaction, specifically with out-groupers, by actively suppressing reference to 548 
such processes.  The explicit link between linguistic reference and actual mental 549 
representation, along with the degree to which participants consciously engage (or disengage) 550 
their theory of mind, remains to be shown by future research.  However, taking other recent 551 
research into account we would speculate that theory of mind cognition is curtailed at a more 552 
fundamental level during interactions with out-group members, prior to any linguistic 553 
reference in conversation.    For example, a recent study has shown that during joint 554 
interaction people fail to spontaneously form mental representations of out-group members 555 
(McClung, Jentzsch, & Reicher, 2013).  In this study, people who did a computerized joint 556 
action task with a perceived in-group member showed altered reaction times due to the 557 
computational demands of mentally representing their partner, whereas people who did the 558 
task with a perceived out-group member reacted as if they were doing the task alone and 559 
evidenced no alteration in reaction times.  This result suggests that the less socially relevant 560 
out-group member does not warrant mental representation even on a subconscious, 561 
unintentional level, which has implications for the current study.  While speculative, a lack of 562 
basic mental representation of the out-group may be the source of the diminished linguistic 563 
reference to out-group members’ mental states: without initial representation of a person one 564 
could hardly use their theory of mind to develop representations of their mental states.  That 565 
is, if out-groupers are not even perceived as potentially intentional beings in the first place, 566 
then this may consequently affect more complex psychological processes, including the 567 
inhibition of theory of mind processes (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005).   568 
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By showing that people reference mental states differently depending on the group 569 
membership of their target, our results extend the growing body of literature which suggests 570 
that actual theory of mind usage is not automatic or consistent.  For instance, recent research 571 
suggests that understanding another’s perspective or feelings does not happen spontaneously 572 
but instead requires effortful cognitive adjustment (e.g. I. A. Apperly et al., 2010; Epley, 573 
Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Nickerson, 1999).   One benefit of the current study is 574 
that the differential mental state reference we showed occurred totally spontaneously in actual 575 
social interactions.  Much of the previous research on theory of mind-related processes is 576 
based on artificial paradigms in which participants are required to mentalise about characters 577 
in a cartoon strip (e.g. Converse et al., 2008) or simply allowed to mentalise about a cartoon 578 
character (Apperly et al., 2006).   In the current study participants interacted naturally and 579 
spontaneously with actual people without any prompts as to the direction of their attention. 580 
This decrease in reference to out-group members’ mental states may also have a range 581 
of consequences for ‘real-world’ social interactions.  First, we would speculate that the 582 
effects we show as a result of minimal categorisation would also carry over to real-life 583 
groups.  Given that such groups would be based on more relevant identities than minimal 584 
groups, it would seem a logical consequence that they would also be more motivated to 585 
maintain their bonds, which sharing more intimate knowledge of each other could facilitate.  586 
Conversely, between members of different groups, decreased mental state reference may 587 
facilitate out-group discrimination, even at its extremes of infrahumanization and 588 
dehumanization (Haslam & Levy, 2006; Leyens et al., 2001).  For example, even if we 589 
assume that theory of mind is functioning normally, without overt reference to a person’s 590 
mental states, it may become easier to perceive such a person as less than human, or at least 591 
to treat them as such.  However, the causal direction of such a link is as yet unclear:  further 592 
research is needed to clarify the link between overt mental state reference and different 593 
aspects of out-group discrimination.  For instance, the simple perception of a common 594 
identity during an interaction may be sufficient to increase mental state reference, which may 595 
in turn prohibit out-group discrimination entirely.   596 
In sum, our results identify one social factor – group membership – as a major factor 597 
in how cognitively normal adults manifest their theory of mind usage, specifically in how 598 
they overtly refer to another person’s mental states during natural conversation.  However, 599 
this study does more than simply add to a list of contextual influences on different theory of 600 
mind-related processes.  These results highlight the importance of group membership in the 601 
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cognition and behavior within our social world.    We do not wish to claim that people never 602 
mentalize about the out-group.  Our argument that mental state reference is contextual is just 603 
that:  there are obvious contexts in which it would behoove a person to understand and 604 
reference the mental states of the out-group.  Future research may identify other social factors 605 
(such as extreme power differentials) that may interact with categorization to impact mental 606 
state reference.   607 
In conclusion, using the minimal group paradigm – a stripped down manipulation of 608 
social group context – the current study shows that people are less willing to talk about the 609 
mental states of anyone categorized ‘other’, and less willing to consider them even afterward 610 
in mentalistic terms.  In sum, whether a person merits overt mental state reference seems to 611 
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